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HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE:
MICRO-LENDING AS AN END TO ILLICIT REMITTANCE
CHARLES B. BOWERS*

I. INTRODUCTION

"Hawala", in Arabic, means "to transfer;"' it is also known as "Hundi,"
meaning "to collect" - from Sanskrit root.2 Though the term might be a new
addition to the western lexicon, it is used quite readily the world-over in some
form. A traveler's check, for example, is known as "hawala safir" from parts of
Africa to Asia and throughout the Middle East.3 This paper, as interlocutor, seeks
to introduce (to re-introduce to some) not only the term hawala, but the unique
security challenges this concept - that of an informal, and less than transparent,
value transfer system - presents. Beyond examining the role of hawala in money
laundering and terrorism finance, the objective of this work is to weigh the
effectiveness of current efforts in addressing these issues, both at the street-level
and in the legislative realm, post September 11, 2001 (9/11). Lastly, the author
offers recommendations based on US, UAE, Turkey, and Netherlands-based
research coupled with numerous interviews with various subject-matter experts
ranging from international bankers to legislators to diplomats to federal agents.
II. THE HAWALA TRANSACTION
Hawala, in its most basic delineation, is "money transfer without money
movement," 4 without movement in formal financial institutions that is. Upon
customer request, a US-based hawaladar - a hawala operator will call, fax, or
email their hawaladar associate in Pakistan, for example, with the specifics of the
transaction (i.e. amount and password only - no names are used). This Pakistanbased hawaladar will then pay the requested amount out of his/her own funds, and
in local currency, upon receiving the agreed upon password from the recipient.
The only paper trail might be a notation, often encoded or in a little-known dialect
.

An attorney living in Washington, D.C. Special thanks to FinCEN, the Grameen Foundation,

professor Marilyn Cane, and Mr. John Cassara.
1. Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala
Systems in Afghanistan v n. 1 (World Bank Publication, Working Paper No. 13, 2003).
2. Saeed Al-Hamiz, Hawala: U.A.E. Perspective, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA
AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 30, 31 (Int'l Monetary Fund, 2005).
3. Id.
4. JOHN A. CASSARA, HIDE & SEEK: INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE STALLED

WAR ON TERRORIST FINANCE 145 (Potomac Books 2006).
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(e.g. Gujarati5 or Memoni 6), of the debt obligation in internal books. The funds are
distributed, often delivered right to the door of the intended recipient, all within a
course of minutes,7 without receipts or paperwork, and all outside of formal
financial institutions.
Theoretically, payments between hawaladars operate both ways. In our
example the Pakistani hawaladar could just as easily request that his US colleague
pay out X to a US recipient. As is typically the case, however, flows tend to be
asymmetrical (i.e., money leaves more developed nations bound for least
developed nations in the form of remittances). It is clear, however, that this trade
is not simply bilateral. Our US and Pakistani hawaladars would be dealing
concurrently with operators in Dhaka, Muscat, Istanbul, London, etc.
Hundreds or thousands of these transactions are bundled together over the
course of weeks or months with consolidation taking place at various levels. Midlevel hawaladars act as clearing houses for small scale operators, larger hawaladars
act as clearing houses for those in the middle, and so on. In Dubai, at the megalevel, tranches of value worth £100,000 are the minimum units of trade in each
hawala swap. 8 Despite this layering, eventually balance sheet positions, even at
the lowest levels, have to be settled.
Some settlement occurs within traditional banking channels, but much of this
balancing of the accounts takes place through alternative channels like cash
couriers. 9 Despite Reports of International Transactions of Currency or Monetary
Instruments (CMIR) reporting requirements,'l money is effectively smuggled
across our borders in this fashion every day. In fact, in the US State Department's
1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, bulk cash smuggling was
deemed one of the most utilized money laundering techniques in the United States
and around the world. In the same report, a decade later, the same holds true: "The
smuggling of bulk currency out of the United States is the largest and most
significant ...money laundering threat facing law enforcement. Deterring direct
access to US financial institutions by criminals does not prevent money
laundering
'1
if illicit proceeds can still reach US accounts through indirect means."
The principal drawback of using couriers is one of logistics. One million
dollars in "street cash" (i.e. bills in $5, $10, and $20 denominations) weighs
5. Patrick M. Jost & Harjit Singh Sandhu, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its
Role in Money Laundering20 n. 13 (A FinCEN/Interpol Paper, 2000).
6. Memoni, often classified as a dialect of Sindhi, is spoken by roughly 500,000 people - most of
whom
live
in
Karachi.
NationMaster
Encyclopedia,
Languages
of
Pakistan,
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Languages-of-Pakistan (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
7. Some hawaladars guarantee receipt of payment within 10 minutes. Interview with hawaladars,
in Sharjah, Dubai, & Abu Dhabi (June 22-30, 2008).
8. Roger Ballard, Hawala: Criminal Haven or Vital FinancialNetwork? Newsletter of the Int'l
Inst. of Asian Studies (Int'l Inst. of Asian Studies, Univ. of Leiden), Oct. 2005, at 5.
9. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 146.
10. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (2009); 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (2009).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: VOLUME II MONEY LAUNDERING AND
FINANCIAL CRIMES 5 (2008) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE].
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approximately 256 pounds. 12 Therefore, in larger transactions, some hawaladars
(or their associates) utilize import/export businesses. Through these companies,
"countervaluation" the settling of accounts through trade rather than transfer
occurs. 3 Countervaluation is done either by the underinvoicing or overinvoicing
of product flows between these import/export businesses.14 For example, if a
hawaladar owed $25,000 to a colleague in Bishkek, he might overinvoice a
shipment of carpets. The carpets, having a true value of $25,000 would be
invoiced at $50,000; $25,000 would cover the legitimate cost of goods and the
remaining $25,000 would settle his/her debt. As John Cassara, former CIA officer
and US Customs agent, notes, "The cover of the business transaction and the
documentation involved wash the money clean .... [A] customs inspector is hardpressed to spot moderate discrepancies in invoice pricing and product
description."'' 5 Whether carpets or gold, it's simply unrealistic to expect customs
agents to wade through mountains of pile verifying knots per square inch or the
purported purity of gold; is it solid gold or simply gold-plated; is it 18-carat or 22carat?
The products involved in countervaluation present tracking challenges in and
of themselves. Though the principle focus of this paper is on the hawala
transaction, the use of goods in the countervaluation process makes the mention of
trade-based money laundering a necessity. And, gold, in particular, presents one of
the most challenging set of security concerns. In fact, some, like Mr. Cassara,
argue that for the role gold plays in ethnic-based alternative remittance systems, it6
should be classified as an alternative remittance system itself (more on this later).'
III.

VALUABLE REMITTANCE TOOL OR NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT?

Remittances - the money that migrant workers send back to their countries of
origin 17 - play a large and ever growing role in the global economy. As far back as
the 1990's, "[D]eposits from emigrants ... represented almost 20 percent of total
deposits in the Portuguese banking system."' 8 Skip ahead a few years, and in 2002
remittances from the US to Latin America averaged $200-300 per month per
person while monthly sums to Pakistan and India were nearly three times that
amount per person.' 9 As a result, by 2003, developing countries were receiving
$96 billion in remittance inflows. 20 This sum accounted for more than 5 percent of

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

CASSARA, supra note 4, at 131.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.

17. Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances in an International Scope 1 (Multilateral Inv. Fund of
the Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper, 2003), availableat http://www.microlinks.org/ev-en.php?
ID=7777_201 &ID2=DOTOPIC.

18. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Jose de Luna Martinez, Workers' Remittances to Developing Countries: A Survey with Central
Banks on Selected Public Policy Issues 4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3638,
2005), availableat http://go.worldbank.org/F43572F 110.
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the 2003 GDPs for 25 developing countries, 2 1 and nearly 7.5 percent of the GDP
and 160 percent of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of Vietnam.
By 2005,
global remittances passing through formal channels exceeded a staggering $233
billion.23
I pause to stress two points here, the first being that the above-mentioned
figures are indeed estimates. There are many reasons, but two in particular, that
suggest why these numbers should be viewed with a modicum of skepticism.
Firstly, there is a lack of uniformity in remittance classification. In many
countries, companies which would otherwise be classified as money transmitters
are considered commercial entities rather than financial institutions, and are,
therefore, exempt from many of the regulatory, oversight, and reporting
requirements. 24 In addition, remittances which are paid through post offices are
seldom reported to financial authorities (as is the case in the US). 25 As such, those
transactions also escape inclusion in remittance data. Secondly, the levels of
reporting, and thus the adequacy of the data collected, vary from country to
country. For example, even where money transfer companies are required to
register as financial institutions, they often fail to report both the number and value
of remittance transactions.26
Another point that needs to be emphasized is that these figures represent only
those flows passing through formal channels. While "most countries do not
measure remittances that occur through informal channels,",27 international bodies
do, and their figures are in the tens of billions of dollars. 28 Some commentators,
like professor Roger Ballard, place international levels higher still: "[u]nrecorded
flows moving through informal channels . . . are conservatively estimated to

amount to at least 50 percent of recorded flows. ' 29 If that statement is accurate,
informal flows would amount to roughly $115 billion annually. In Pakistan alone,
"[o]fficials .. .estimate that more than $7 billion flow into the nation through

hawala channels each year. 30 To put these numbers into perspective, the sum of
3
formal and informal remittance flows is somewhere around $350 billion per year, '
while 2007 CIA Factbook figures list China's budget revenues at just $450
billion.32
21. Id.
22. Raul Hernandez-Coss, The Canada-Vietnam Remittance Corridor: Lessons on Shifting from
Informal to Formal Transfer Systems 4 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 48, 2005), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/TUUN6HHHE0.
23. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
24. Martinez, supra note 20, at 8.

25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 8-9.
27. Id. at 12.
28. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY TO THE FINANCIAL

WAR ON TERRORISM, Fact Sheet 15 (2002).
29. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
30. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 28, at 15.
31. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
32. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/.
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Cautionary notes aside, no matter how broad the discrepancies between the
actual figures and the estimates above, and between reporting methodologies and
the actual data, two things are clear. First, give or take hundreds of thousands of
dollars, or tens of billions of dollars for that matter, and the numbers involved are
still enormous. Second, there is a clear bifurcation of preference among remitters.
Some choose to utilize the formal sector while others, often at risk of criminal
prosecution, opt for the informal.
Why is that the case? Why would one prefer to send money through a
hawaladar? There are four basic incentives that seem to fuel this choice: (1) the
absence of formal sector alternatives, (2) cultural familiarity, (3) affordability, and
(4) anonymity.
"[H]awala continues to be the best option for most immigrants and the only
one for those coming from regions devastated by civil conflict and disasters., 33 In
Afghanistan, in the absence of traditional financial institutions, hawaladars
provided the only viable commercial banking services while the Taliban held
power.34 Even after the ousting of the Taliban, what banks there were, "were
plagued by significant weaknesses, among them, weak corporate governance ....
unskilled human resources, outdated technolog[y] . . .

,

and grave problems of

liquidity and solvency,, 35 not to mention corruption and outright theft.
Traditional banks and wire services were, and still are, simply reluctant to risk
the capital and personnel required to set up shop in regions like Afghanistan and
the tribal areas of Pakistan. Yes, traditional financial institutions do exist in the
urban centers, but keep in mind that hawala is attractive not only to the unserviced, but to the under-serviced as well. Just because bank X might have a
branch in Karachi, does not mean that it is either expedient or safe to travel for
hours through rough neighborhoods, cash in hand, to do business. Hawaladars, as
a "safe" alternative, offer to deliver payments to the doors of recipients, even to
those in rural areas - areas that are disproportionately victimized by the violence of
radicals, tribal chieftans, and warlords.
Our second incentive, that of cultural familiarity, or what professor Nikos
Passas, of Northeastern University, terms "cultural inertia," also plays a significant
role. 36 Saeed al-Hamiz, Executive Director of the Banking Supervision and
Examination Department of the Central Bank of the UAE, tries to explain the
cultural/historical significance of hawala as follows:

33. Nikos Passas, Formalizing the Informal: Problems in the National and International
Regulation of Hawala, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE

SYSTEMS 7, 9 (International Monetary Fund, 2005).
34. Maimbo, supra note 1, at 1.
35. Samuel Maimbo, Challenges of Regulating and Supervising the Hawaladars of Kabul, in
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 47, 51 (IMF, 2005).

36. Passas, supra note 33, at 10.
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Hawala . . predates bank transfers by hundreds of years. During the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the development of trade between
regions called for the establishment of reliable and trustworthy
instruments to finance those transactions
Hawala
.
operated
within tight-knit extended families that were based in two or more

major trading centers.

37

At the operator level, not much has changed since the twelfth century. For
example, within many hawala networks, and other informal remittance systems,
the core of trust among operators still consists of familial ties. Further, they
continue to be ethnically exclusive in the services they provide (e.g. you must be
Vietnamese to access the Vietnamese system). 38 This exclusion by force of habit
and community tradition acts as a formidable obstacle to commercial competition
from the outside. In that sense our second incentive simply reinforces incentive
one. And, again, this is particularly true in rural areas where rarer dialects, lesser
known traditions, and a general distrust of outsiders act as further barriers to entry.
Despite this fairly high level of service, hawaladars manage to keep their
costs, and thus their prices (i.e. a fee in the form of a percentage of the amount
remitted, often only 1-2 percent), 39 low - our third incentive. Remittance fees (e.g.
8.3-13 percent from NY to Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka) can be extremely
expensive, comparatively, when utilizing formal sector avenues.

Unlike stand-

alone banks and wire services that have to pass their high overhead costs on to
their customers, hawaladars, which are often integrated with other businesses,
share the costs of infrastructure. 40 Further, these businesses provide cover for
illicit money transmitters whom subsequently save additional monies by avoiding
registration and reporting requirements. In addition, many of these entities are
family owned and operated. 41 As such, insurance, retirement plans, and minimum
wage are often ignored. As an added bonus, as these businesses (e.g. ethnic
grocers, foreign exchange houses, rug dealers, travel agencies, etc.) tend to cater to
ethnic populations, they provide hawaladars with steady streams of potential
clientele.
Lastly, the real savings that is passed on to customers is created via currency
speculation.

"Hawala-type transactions

.

.

.

provide special advantages in

situations where the remitting country has a convertible currency and no capital
controls,42 and the receiving country has inconvertible currency and/or a black

37.
38.
39.
40.

AI-Hamiz, supra note 2, at 30-31.
Hernandez-Coss, supra note 22, at 29.
Jost, supra 5, at 6.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 NATIONAL
LAUNDERING STRATEGY 22 (2002), availableat http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/

MONEY

publications/ml2002.pdf.
41. Al-Hamiz, supranote 2, at 31.
42. Capital Controls are government mandated conversion of foreign currency into local currency,
often at unfavorable rates -- think Cuba or the former Soviet Union. CTR. FOR POPULAR ECONOMICS,
CONTROLLING CAPITAL

2 (2006).
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market exchange rate. 4 3 Given the low overhead costs of hawala operations, as
discussed above, hawaldars can profit from the slimmest of margins alone. A US
hawaladar was quoted as saying that his business could still make money on just a
2 percent exchange rate margin.44
Ultimately, further "discounts" may be passed on to unwitting remitters by
hawaladars that are willing to circulate counterfeit notes. Given that hawaladars
live and die on the basis of trust, this is, admittedly, a rare thing. But, it does
happen. In 2003, for example, "substantial volumes of freshly printed, shrinkwrapped Afghani notes," of Russian origin and of questionable authenticity, were
discovered in Afghanistan and were only made "available to dealers selling
dollars. ' 45
Anonymity, our fourth and last incentive, should come as no surprise given
that hawala is illegal in many countries,4 6 and given that hawala owes much of its

affordability to illegal currency speculation and other questionable business
practices. This point is best illustrated by the fact that even in the United Arab
Emirates (the "UAE"), where hawala is legal to the extreme, hawaladars refused to
come forward in order to attend the Abu Dhabi "International Conference on
Hawala. 4 7 As a further, and more comical, illustration, in 2002, US Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neil's advance security team visited a Dubai hawala in
preparation for his visit the following day.48 When Secretary O'Neil arrived for
his meeting he found that not only were the hawaladars missing, but that the entire
storefront had been removed the night before.49
Again, with all that we know about hawala these accounts might not be
surprising. What might be surprising, however, is that this desire for secrecy
extends to the remitters themselves, and not just to the obvious, viz money
launderers, tax evaders, and terrorist organizations. Throughout their working
lives, migrant workers the world-over tend to fluctuate in their legal status. Some
may enter one country illegally and then subsequently "earn" the right to stay,
while others might initially enter through legal channels but overstay their visas.
While this legal fragility might do little to temper the flow of immigrants, or the
flow of money home for that matter, what it does is create a fear of all government
and quasi-government institutions post offices, banks, etc. As a result, and
coupled with the incentives above, what emerges is a natural inclination to opt for
the informal versions of necessary services. In the context of money transmitters,
this would be hawaladars.

43. John F. Wilson, Hawala and Other Informal Payment Systems: An Economic Perspective 4
(IMF Working Paper, 2002).
44. Jost, supra note 5, at 7.
45. Maimbo, supra note 35, at 17.
46. Passas, supra note 33, at 13.
47. Id.
48. JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF INTERNATIONAL

FINANCE INTHE POST-9/11 WORLD 24 (2007).
49. Id.
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Lastly, as an addendum to our fourth incentive, I include something that I call
"anonymity by default." In Pakistan and Yemen illiteracy stands at 50 percent,
while in Somalia and Afghanistan the figures are 60 percent and 70 percent
respectively. 50 Given both the high emigration totals for countries with lower
levels of education and the high rates of immigration for countries employing
manual laborers, one can deduce that many remittance senders are, at best, poorly
educated. Many can neither read nor write their own names, much less fill out
and/or decipher account statements, deposit slips, and transfer orders.
Consequently, for this segment of the population, the need for identification means
little more than an invitation for ridicule. As such, the ease by which one can send
money through a hawaladar by simply verbalizing a password is attractive in that it
masks a lack of education; anonymity is simply an added bonus.
Despite how attractive these incentives are, and ironically due to how
attractive these incentives are, hawala does have a darker potentiality. Though
popular media has only recently discovered hawala and its dark side, the potential
for abuse has appeared on the radars of both the law enforcement and intelligence
communities for years before September the 1Ith, 2001. Though before 9/11, as
Senior Economist of the International Monetary Fund's Middle Eastern
Department John Wilson states, "This [analysis] was generally in the context of
money laundering and underground banking activities. For instance, hawala has
been commonly mentioned in the periodic typologies of money laundering systems
prepared by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by FATF-affiliates such as
the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering.'
Only after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did knee-jerk
speculation by various federal agencies bring the presumed relationship between
hawala and terrorism finance to the forefront.52 This, despite the fact that
hawaladars played only a minor role in the 9/11 attacks; 53 "most of the identified
funding was transferred via cash, wire-transfers, and travelers' checks, 54 - the bulk
of funds passing through SunTrust Bank accounts in Venice, Florida.55 Further,
neither method nor amount triggered Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs), Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), or Reports of International
Transactions of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIRs).56
All that said, hawala has, on multiple occasions, been used to finance terrorist
activities. A senior Indian law enforcement official even went so far as to say that
all terrorist attacks in India are financed through hawala.57 While certainly an
overstatement, Interpol has reported verifiable accounts of terrorist funds passing

50. See CIA, supra note 32.
51. Wilson, supra note 44, at 1.
52. Mark Butler & Rachelle Boyle, Alternative Remittance Regulation Implementation Package 5
(Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering Paper, 2003).
53. Passas, supra note 33, at 14.
54. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 176.
55. Ballard, supra note 8, at 2.
56. See CASSARA, supra note 4, at 190.
57. Id. at 178.
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through hawaladars in India and elsewhere. The military hardware used to
assassinate an important Indian politician was purchased with hawala funding.58
The requisite explosives used in the bombing of a major Indian city in 1993 were
purchased with funds flowing through hawala operators in the U.K., Dubai, and
60
India. 59 And, al-Qaeda operatives, via the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain
(more on this later), responsible for the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam were funded, in part, through local hawaladars, 61 just to name a few.
While of course it is true that most of the estimated $115 billion in informal
remittances is spent in harmless ways, this should bring little comfort given that
terrorist operations cost so little in relative terms. The 9/11 attacks, for example,
are estimated to have cost $300,000$500,000.62 This is quite a small sum when
one considers the more than $1,000,000,000 in damage caused.63 That fact is
particularly troubling when one recognizes that the 9/11 attacks were an anomaly
in terms of operational costs, most terrorist events cost far less than $100,000.64
[A]ccording to the UN it is believed that the 1998 simultaneous truck
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania cost less than
$50,000; the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden is estimated
to have cost less than $10,000; the Bali bombings in October 2002 cost
less than $50,000; the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta
cost about $30,000; the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 cost less

than $40,000; the March 2004 Madrid train attacks cost about
$10,000;65

[and the London bombings in July 2005 cost 8,000 British pounds].66
In sum, though the concept of hawala is fairly straightforward, what should
have been made clear by this discussion is that the role that it plays on the
international stage is anything but straightforward. Is it a valuable remittance tool
or is it a national security threat? The answer, as frustrating as it may be, is that it
is both. And, it is precisely this duality - simultaneously an affordable remittance
option to the unbanked and nefarious funding vehicle to terrorists and money
launderers - that makes regulation both so tricky and so unattractive to politicians.
There is, understandably, a reluctance in poorer countries to close the tap through
which vital monies flow. But, there is an equally compelling, or perhaps more
compelling, security interest in favor of regulating these informal channels (we

58. Jost, supra note 5, at 14.
59. Id.
60. Taylor, supra note 49, at 22.
61. Ballard, supra note 8, at 2.
62. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 176.
63. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, How much did the September 11 terrorist
attack cost America? http://www.iags.org/costof911 .html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
64. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 190.
65. Id.
66. United Kingdom Home Office 2006 Press Release 7 (FATF/GAFI Working Paper on Terrorist
Financing, 2008).
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examine some of these regulatory efforts in the following sections). This is
especially true when (1) there is a proven track record of abuse, and (2) there may
be viable alternatives to hawala in the formal sector that we have yet to utilize.
IV.

THE EFFICACY OF REGULATION EFFORTS

A. InternationalRegulation
Prior to the September the 11th attacks the international community was well
aware of the potential abuse of alternative remittance avenues in the context of
money laundering. This is hardly a surprise given the sheer scale of laundered
funds globally; according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates,
laundered funds account for as much as 5 percent of the global GDP, or $3.6
trillion a year. 67 In fact, "every FATF typologies report since 1996 has noted the
use of alternative remittance systems by criminal groups to launder money. 6 8
Note: despite the ambiguity in this FATF reference to the laundering of funds by
"criminal groups," the bulk of these laundered funds, and consequently the bulk of
attention paid by the international community, was/is attributed to the illicit sale of
narcotics.69
Terrorism finance on the other hand, when juxtaposed with this mountain of
narco-money, seems rather inconsequential. The UN dollar estimates for terrorist
events, cited above, represent the direct operational costs of the attacks themselves.
But, even when one also includes recruiting costs, sustenance costs, training costs,
propaganda costs, etc., as one must to reach a more accurate number, the figures
still pale in comparison. This statement of course assumes that within this vast
pool of black money one can readily distinguish terrorist funds from those of the
cartels, illegal arms brokers, car thieves, etc. This author doesn't think it is that
easy given that obfuscation is built into the system at every level.
In fact, to illustrate just how tough this categorization actually is, I again cite
to the US Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
In the March 2008 edition, the report lists over fifty countries and territories that
have been given the "Major money laundering countries" designation.70 Major
money laundering countries are defined in section 481(e)(7) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as one "whose financial institutions engage in currency
transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics
trafficking. 7 1
Without more, the insufficiency of this definition, akin to the very first
international conventions on money laundering which made drug trafficking acts
the only predicate offenses - the underlying crimes that produce the proceeds
which, when laundered, lead to the offense of money laundering 72 is obvious.

67. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, supra note 11.
68. Butler & Justice, supra note 53, at 7.
69. See Matthew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The American Law and Its GlobalSignificance,
3-SUM NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 24,24-25 (1997).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 12.
71. Id. at 11.
72. PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
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Thankfully, however, the 2008 report continues with the following inclusive notes:
[T]he complex nature of money laundering transactions today makes it
difficult in many cases to distinguish the proceeds of narcotics
trafficking from the proceeds of other serious crime ...[Therefore
t]his year's list of major money laundering countries recognizes this
relationship by including all countries and other jurisdictions whose
financial institutions engage in transactions involving significant
amounts of proceeds from all serious crime.73
Just as the US was compelled to expand its definition of "major money
laundering countries" so too was the international community forced to adopt
additional predicate offenses in recognition of this difficulty in divining the source
and end-use of these funds.74 After all, the same dollar, or peso, or lira that can
buy cocaine today can buy a rocket-propelled grenade launcher tomorrow. In fact,
the term 'narcoterrorism,' as best illustrated by groups like the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) aptly describes this cross-miscegenation.
Whether the proceeds from coca or the opium poppy, a portion of these monies are
recycled back into the security/terrorist apparatus necessary to cultivate, protect,
move, and push their product. Bottom-line: to chip away at money laundering is to
indirectly combat terrorism finance and vice versa.
B. Terrorism Finance Treaties & the 1267 Committee
In 1999, the UN adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism, "[n]oting that the number and seriousness of acts of
75
international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain.9
Article 2(1) of the convention states the following:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention
if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as
76
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex.
Given the lack of agreement in the international legal community regarding
the definition of 'terrorism,' the highlighted verbiage in Article 2(l)(a) is
important. As such, I here provide the list of annexed conventions in its entirety.
77
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);

THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM III-1
(2d ed. 2006).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 11-12.
74. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at 111-1.
75. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, at
3, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (1999) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Terrorism Financing Convention].
76. Id. art. 2(1)(a) (emphasis added).
77. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (1971 );78 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973);79
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);80 Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980);81 Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
(1988);82 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988);83 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);84
and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(1997).85

As biting as Article 2 may first appear there are several problems with this
convention, the first being the form of the instrument itself. As a convention,
further action (e.g. ratification) is required by member States before
recommendations take legal effect at the domestic level. Even then (even if signed
and ratified) there are several escape clauses within the convention that hinder full
implementation.
Article 2(2)(b) of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, for instance, allows for the selective
adoption of the treaties annexed to this convention the very same treaties that
define the crime to which this convention speaks.86 By allowing limited adherence

to these treaties one may effectively manage (i.e. limit) the scope of the crime as
applied to his/her country.
Yet another escape clause emerges in the form of Article 8 which states that
"Each State Party shall take appropriate measures . . . for the identification,

detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of
committing the offences set forth in Article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from
such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture. '' 7 Again, this language sounds

78. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
79. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
80. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
81. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.
82. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474.
83. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201.
84. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
85. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149
U.N.T.S. 256.
86. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 76, art. 2(2)(b).
87. Id. art. 8(1).
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as tough as did Article 2, initially. But, Article 8 implementation is prefaced by
the phrase "in accordance with [Member States'] domestic legal principles. 8 8
The Francois, duc de la Rochefoucauld maxim "Truth does not do as much
good in the world as the semblance of truth does evil" 89 is certainly applicable here
90
where international mandates are qualified by "domestic legal principles."
Countries are thus allowed to choose how enforcement will occur at home, if at all,
all the while receiving kudos for having signed an international treaty against
terrorism. In reality, problem states freeze suspect assets, thereby facially
complying with the law, but then refuse to prosecute based on domestic legal
principles that are often antiquated, apathetic, religiously-biased, and/or altogether
lacking. This inaction allows respective statutes of limitations to run, thus baring
prosecution and resulting in the eventual release of the previously frozen funds.
This is exactly what hampered both the investigation and prosecution of the
Saudi charity al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF). According to the US
Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, the US branch of AHF,
headquartered in Oregon, was involved in tax evasion and money laundering in an
attempt to disguise funds bound for Chechen fighters. 91 In addition, it was
discovered that the Somali and Bosnian branch offices had92a long running
association with both al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and al-Qaeda.
Despite a US terrorism designation on September 9th, 2004 and a UN
designation under UNSCR 1267 (see below) on September 28th, the Saudi
government consistently refused, and still refuses, to prosecute its nationals, citing
an insufficiency of evidence.93
As the most blatant instance of this
noncooperation, Suliman al-Buthe, AHF USA's former attorney and senior
executive, despite having been specially designated as a global terrorist by
INTERPOL,94 was given a position in the Saudi Health Ministry for his troubles.95
In fact, al-Buthe felt so comfortable that he gave an interview to the BBC, 96from his
apartment in Riyad, in which he laughed off his special designation status.

88. Id.
89. FRANCOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS

64 (Leonard Tancock trans., Penguin Classics

1988) (1665).
90. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 76, art. 8(1).
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, U.S.-Based Branch of Al Haramain Foundation
Linked to Terror Treasury Designates U.S. Branch, Director (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/j s1895.htm.
92. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Contributions by the Dep't of the
Treasury to the Fin. War on Terrorism (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases
/reports/2002910184556291211 .pdf.
93. Jihad and the Petrodollar: Programme Two (BBC News Internet podcast Nov. 2007),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/documentaryarchive/7108987.stm.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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In 1999, as a compliment to the International Convention for the Suppression
97
of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267.
Resolution 1267 "require[s] member States to freeze the assets of the Taliban,
Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda and entities owned or controlled by them, as
98
designated by the 'Sanctions Committee' (now called the 1267 Committee)."
While an improvement in terms of the power of the instrument - 1267 is a Chapter
VII (i.e., legally binding) Resolution which requires no further action on behalf of
member States to take legal effect - the same issues of subjective application and
prosecution remain. While Resolution 1267 requires the freezing of suspect assets,
it does not speak to the ultimate disposition of those funds after the initial freezing.
Are they to be returned to those whom have been wrongly accused of having links
to the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, and al-Qaeda? Are they to be returned upon a
failure to prosecute (for any reason)? Are portions to be returned if the suspect
agrees to "gift" the remainder to the government or to a religious charity?
C. FinancialAction Task Force (FATF) Recommendations

In an attempt to address some of the questions above, and to provide badly
needed uniformity, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - originally created in
1989 by the G-7 to combat money laundering99 expanded its mission to include
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). In October of 2001, just a month after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FATF issued 8 Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing, adopting a 9th in 2004.00

When combined with its 40

Recommendations on Money Laundering, originally released in 1990,101 the
recommendations serve as a body of international mandates with regards to
AML/CFT programming.
Special Recommendation 1: Ratification and implementation of UN
The FATF calls for the adoption of the above-mentioned
instruments.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
UNSCR 1373.102 In addition, countries are urged to implement all "resolutions
10 3
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.,
Special Recommendation 2: Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and
associated money laundering. While the title is self-explanatory, the meat of this
recommendation comes in the call to expand predicate offenses. This is significant
because the concepts of terrorism finance and money laundering are new editions
to many legal systems in the Middle East and in South Asia. In fact, "in the early

97. G.A. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
98. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at 111-5.
99. Id. at 111-7 to 111-8.
100. Fin. Action Task Force [FATF], 9 Special Recommendations on TerroristFinancing(Oct. 24,
2004), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_34032073 1 1 1
1,00.html.
101. FATF, The 40 Recommendations (June 2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,
en_32250379_32236930_33658140 1 1 1,00.html.
102. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at Annex V-1.
103. Id.
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04
1990s fewer than two dozen nations had criminalized money laundering."'
Today that number has increased nearly eight fold. 0 5 By the end of 2007,
reflecting a comparable upward trend, the number of jurisdictions that had
criminalized terrorist financing reached 137.106

Special Recommendation 3: Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets.
Recommendation 3 calls not only for the freezing and confiscation of terrorist
assets, it targets the proceeds and assets purchased with the proceeds of such
activities as well, no matter how removed. If applied in broad strokes, the
incentive for legitimate companies (e.g. ethnic grocers) to allow illicit remittance
operations to piggyback on their infrastructure, for example, is substantively
decreased. Grocers who might receive a few hundred dollars in 'hush-money'
each month now have to contemplate losing their entire business, their home, their
cars, their accounts, anything that that money was either spent on or comingled
with.
Special Recommendation 4: Reporting suspicious transactions related to
terrorism. Recommendation 4 calls for "financial institutions, or other businesses
or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations" to report suspect
transactions.10 7 Suspicion alone is apparently the standard of proof which sets into
motion this reporting requirement.
Special Recommendation 5: International cooperation. Countries shall ensure
territorial integrity with regard to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist
financiers. That is to say, countries shall not provide, nor acquiesce in being used
as, a terrorist safe haven.
Special Recommendation 6: Alternative remittance. All countries should
require either the licensing or registration of all formal and informal money/value
transfer services. In addition, both formal and informal money/value transfer
services should be subject to the FATF 40 Recommendations. Lastly, failure to
comply should result in appropriate sanction.
Special Recommendation 7: Wire transfers. Financial institutions of all
stripes are required to supply "meaningful originator information (name, address,
and account number)". Further, they are either to refuse or to scrutinize transfers
that contain incomplete originator information.
Special Recommendation 8: Non-profit organizations. In recognition of the
particular ease by which criminal elements can masquerade as non-profits,
countries are called on to strengthen applicable transparency laws (e.g. auditing
requirements, governance, etc.). In addition, countries are called on to prevent the
exploitation of legitimate entities by nefarious organizations.
Special Recommendation 9: Cash couriers. "Countries should have measures
in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer

104. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 139.

105. Id.
106. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 4.
107. SCHOT, supra note 73, at Annex V-2.
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negotiable instruments . . . ." Further, in the case of detection, authorities should
be granted the power to confiscate suspect currency or monetary instruments.
The initial international cohesion that FATF Special Recommendations
provided, post 9/11, was certainly needed. However, as now applied, these
recommendations are of limited value. This is principally because the FATF is
merely an intergovernmental policy group. As such, it has no enforcement
capability whatsoever, which, despite global notoriety, is exactly why FATF
intellectual products are termed "recommendations." Without an enforcement
mandate, countries are free to trim, or altogether ignore, policy implementation.
At the individual level, Special Recommendation 1 does nothing more than
incorporate UN instruments that, as discussed above, can be gamed to the point of
being rendered ineffectual. And, while in theory, Special Recommendation 2 is a
welcomed broadening of predicate offenses, in practice, it was difficult to get
counties excited about enforcement when there were only a handful of applicable
offenses. Now, complements of Recommendation 2, policing agencies abroad face
expanding responsibilities without commensurate increases in enforcement
budgets. A wider net alone does not guarantee a larger catch if one lacks either the
will or the strength to hoist the net back into the boat.
Special Recommendations 3 and 4 both suffer from qualitative enforcement
issues. As to Recommendation 3, the freezing and seizure of assets means very
little if an eventual prosecution does not follow. Funds are all too often allowed to
thaw and assets are all too often returned. As to Recommendation 4, the reporting
of suspicious transactions applies only to financial institutions and to those entities
that are subject to anti-money laundering obligations. As discussed in the
Valuable Remittance Tool or National Security Threat section, 1°8 in many
countries, businesses that would otherwise be classified as financial institutions are
considered mere commercial entities. As such, they often escape both the
definitional stigma of 'financial institution' and the subjection to anti-money
laundering obligations. Further, even when financial institutions and money
transfer services are subject to such obligations they are incentivized by the
absence of enforcement to underreport both the value and numeracy of legitimate
transfers, let alone suspicious transactions - which would bring unwanted
regulatory attention.
Special Recommendation 5 calls for the denial of safe havens to terrorists,
terrorist organizations, and terrorist financiers. Below is just a sampling of the
many instances where reality veers from legislative idealism. I again cite to the Al
Haramain case above, and to the following: ETA continues to operate in the
Basque areas of Spain and in southern France, 10 9 Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu
Sayyaf Group fighters continue to shelter in both the Philippines and Indonesia,l°

108. See supra pp. 10-11.
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1 12
the PKK is alive and well in northern Iraq,"' Hezbollah thrives in Lebanon,
Ittihad al Islami hides in Somalia, 113 Hamas owns the Palestinian Territories, 1 4 the
Sadrists train in Iraq, 115 the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir continue to operate in the
Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley, 116 and a significant amount
of al-Qaeda senior leadership now lives in the tribal areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.1 17 I digress.

Special Recommendation 6 calls for the licensing or registration of all formal
and informal money/value transfer services. According to the Interpretive Note to
Special Recommendation 6, 'licensing' means "a requirement to obtain permission
from a designated competent authority in order to operate .
,I18 'Registration',
on the other hand, simply means "a requirement to . . . declare to a designated
competent authority the existence of" a money/value transfer business.1 19 Between
the two approaches, registration, for obvious reasons, is far less intrusive.
It should be of little surprise then that the UAE opts for registration alone. In
2003, the Central Bank of the UAE issued "Regulation Concerning Hawaladars
(Hawala Brokers) for Registration and Reporting." 120
Through various
announcements in local newspapers, hawaladars were "invit[ed] . . . to register
with the Central Bank and obtain a free-of-charge certificate." 12 1 By the end of
this registration drive only 184 hawaladars applied for certification. 122 Perspective:
there are 600 plus Starbucks locations in Florida alone,' 23 and yet in the hawala
capital of the world only 184 hawaladars registered. Certainly there are more, and
yet Special Recommendation 6 calls for the licensing or registration of all formal
and informal money/value transfer services (more on UAE noncompliance later).
As with the Special Recommendations collectively, Special Recommendation
6 and 7 suffer from a simple lack of follow-through. If wire transfers are not
scrutinized or altogether refused for containing insufficient originator information,
what exactly is the penalty? All too often, the answer is nothing. In fact, even
here at home, it's readily admitted that "most money service businesses do not
124
comply with ... requirements and there is little enforcement of the regulations."'
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112. Id.
113. Id.
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115. CIA, supra note 32.
116. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at Annex VI-] 5.
119. Id. at Annex VI-16.
120. CENTRAL BANK OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, LAWS REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
IMPLEMENTED IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
TERRORISM 9 (2005), availableat http://centralbank.ae/pdf/AMLSU/RegulationSummary-2005.pdf.
121. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added) (reference ANNEX for original U.A.E. registration documents).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Starbucks, http://www.starbucks.com/retail/locator/ViewAll.aspx?a- 1&CountrylD=244
&StatelD =5&FC=RETAIL&City (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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For a variety of reasons (discussed in detail in the Disincentivized
Cooperation section), enforcement efforts behind Recommendation 8 are not, and I
believe never will be, complied with in the Middle East and in parts of Asia. The
Pakistan-based al-Rashid Trust - a group which provided funding for both the
Taliban and al-Qaeda via the Global Jihad Fund, supported the Jaish Mohammed
terrorist group, and was directly linked to the kidnapping and subsequent murder
of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl 125 for example, was designated as a
terrorist facilitator/financier by the UN in October of 2001.126 Initially, and in
facial compliance with UNSCR 1267, the Pakistani Interior Ministry banned alRashid and ordered the freezing of its assets. 127 Two points: (1) the ban did not
take effect until well after the designation, 128 thus allowing the terrorists precious
time in which to drain their accounts; and (2) the Sindh High Court (SHT) has
since ordered the government to lift the ban on the charity. 129 Lastly, in an article
by Naveed Siddiqui of Pakistan's Daily Times, Rashid Trust organizers - free from
arrest or prosecution
stated that they would continue their work by simply
renaming their charity the Al Amin Welfare Trust. 3 0
Little that has been done with respect to Recommendation 9 has been
effective in stopping money laundering, generally, and terrorism finance, in
particular. Volume II of the 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
states that bulk cash (and I would add gold) smuggling continues to be one the
most utilized money laundering techniques in the world. 13' This is due, in part, to
the high levels of currency required to trigger the international equivalents of
Reports of International Transactions of Currency or Monetary Instruments
(CMIRs). In the US, one has to declare cash only when in excess of $10,000, in
South Africa 175,000 rand (approximately $24,600),132 and in Moldova 10,000
euros (approximately $14,160).'
Given that terrorists regularly utilize cash
couriers to transit funds, and given that attacks cost so little in relative terms, I
would argue that these figures are too high.
In addition, I would suggest that bulk cash smuggling provisions are
circumvented by smuggling more compact, and less overt, forms of value (e.g.,
jewelry). However, even in countries where one must declare the value of
precious stones and metals being carried, the trigger value amounts are still much
too large. In Saudi Arabia, for example, one must only report the carrying of gold

125. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury Office of Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, Al Rashid
Trust (Sept. 23, 2001), availableat http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/
charities execorder_13224-a.shtml.
126. Id.
127. Naveed Siddiqui, Al-Rashid Trust Plans to Work Under New Name, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Apr.
29, 2007, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 2 007\04\29\story-29-42007_pg7_3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 5.
132. Id. at 419.
133. Id. at 334.
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134
and jewels if the value amount exceeds 60,000 Saudi riyals ($16,000 approx.).
As such, a large family could simply walk across the border with nearly $100,000
in unreported, untraceable value.

In his book Hide & Seek, John Cassara provides a brief illustration of the
35
tracing complications that gold presents in what is known as 'The Gold Cycle."
Switzerland, for its infamous secrecy in banking and the glut of cash accumulated
thereby, has emerged as one of the top manufacturers of gold bars.' 36 From
Switzerland, the gold is shipped to Italy. The gold is then transformed, for resale,
into what amounts to hundreds of tons of gold rope and chain each year, thus
making Italy "the largest exporter of worked gold in the world."' 137 From Italy,
with the gold now in a form that is more readily transported without question, it is
taken by couriers - under falsified shippers export documents - or by smugglers
(posing as casual tourists) into other countries.
The amount gained by avoiding taxation on export/import is the laundered
value. Any gold that is not resold can be melted back into ingot form and used as
currency that escapes account freezes and Bank Secrecy Act (more on this later)
detection. The proceeds from sale, however, can be divvied up into multiple
currencies and sent either to offshore bank accounts or back to Switzerland to
purchase more gold to start the cycle again.
D. The Egmont Group of FIUs
In 1995, at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels, various Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs) met to discuss the strengthening of national AML/CFT
programs. 138 Thereafter, the group became known as the Egmont Group of
FIUs. 139 The group's official definition of an FIU serves both as an explanatory
and as a barrier to entry; in order to become a member, a country must first be able
to satisfy the definition below.
[A] central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as
permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent
authorities, disclosures of financial information:
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing
of terrorism, or
(ii) required by national regulation, in order to counter money
0
laundering and terrorist financing.14

134. Id. at 6.
135. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 73-74.
136. Id. at 74.
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138. Press Release, Egmont Group, Major Meeting of FIU's in Korea Progresses the Fight Against
Money Laundering and Terrorist Fin. (May 29, 2008), availableat http://www.egmontgroup.org/
PRESSRELEASEversion 27_MAY_2008_G.pdf.
139. The Egmont Group, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), http://www.egmontgroup.org/
aboutegmont.pdf (last visited Feb.5, 2009).
140. The Egmont Group, Interpretive Note Concerning the Egmont Definition of a Financial
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FIUs serve as repositories of suspect financial information. 141
This
information is analyzed and shared through a secured web server - the Egmont
Secure Web (ESW) -and through multiple working group meetings held
throughout the year. 142 FIUs pride themselves in this ability to rapidly disseminate
financial intelligence both to their peers and to nonmember states. I, however,
question the wisdom of information sharing with countries that appear to be more a
part of the problem than the solution. The US State Department admits that "far
too many countries that boast solid AML/CFT standards and infrastructures are
still simply not enforcing their laws.', 143 The statement continues, "In some cases
the lack of enforcement is due to a lack of capacity, but in far too many others it is
144
due to a lack of political will.'
My concern is twofold. First, I worry that problem states can hide beneath a
patina of legitimacy while doing nothing substantive in the line of enforcement.
By having AML/CFT legislation on the books, regimes can claim that they are in
full compliance with international standards (e.g. the Egmont criteria), regardless
of follow-through. The Nigerians, for example, were placed on the FATF's list of
non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) in 2001. '45 However, within one
year the FATF claimed that "Nigeria enacted two pieces of legislation to remedy
the deficiencies.' 46 How can the passage of legislation without any enforcement
intent remedy deficiencies? As a result, and without any genuine effort, Nigeria,
an Egmont member despite ranking 147 out of 180 - 180 being the worst - on
Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index,' 47 now has
leverage to fend off its critics that push for verifiable reform.
This leverage also enables individuals to broadcast questionable assurances to
the financial community-at-large. In a 2008 article in the Khaleej Times,
Abdulrahim Mohamed al-Awadi Assistant Executive Director and Head of the
Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) at the Central
Bank of the UAE - stated that "[t]he U.A.E. has a very robust AML/CFT
regime," 148 therefore, banks should not hesitate in allowing money exchanges to
open "Nostro Accounts.' 149 I am not saying that Mr. al-Awadi is a liar, nor am I
interpretive.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
141. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, FIN. INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2004), availableat

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fiu/fiu.pdf.
142. The Egmont Group, Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group
6, http://www.egmontgroup.org/info-paper final-oct_2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
143. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 9.
144. Id. at 10.
145. FATF, Review to Identify, Non-Cooperative Country Territories: Increasing the Worldwide
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22, 2001), available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/56/41/33922055.pdf.
146. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 351.
147. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, http://transparency.org/

policy research/surveys-indices/cpi/2007 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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TIMES Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticIeNew.aspsection
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149. Nostro accounts enable foreign entities to hold, abroad, large amounts of a particular country's
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suggesting that the UAE lacks AML/CFT standards (of some sort). What I am
saying, however, is that the existence of an AML/CFT regime, that may or may not
ever be enforced, should not be the sole basis by which banks decide to do
business.
By touting compliance at some level, countries also argue that they are
entitled to training and information sharing. This brings me to my second concern.
By training some of the most corrupt governments on the planet, are we not simply
making them more sophisticated transgressors? Moldova, for example, recently
received advanced financial investigative techniques training by the IRS's
Criminal Investigation Division.15° This, despite a move towards establishing an
Offshore Financial Center (OFC) in the face of US opposition; 151 despite the fact
that out of 165,199 suspicious activity reports only 4 criminal cases bearing money
laundering charges were initiated (up from 0 in532006),152 and despite 0 arrests
and/or prosecutions involving terrorist financing. 1
Access to resources and sensitive information continues to be granted to the
Romanian FIU - Oficiul Nacional de Prevenire si Combatere a SpalariiBanilor
(ONPCSB) 5 4 - despite the fact that "investigations have resulted in only a handful
of successful prosecutions to date."' 155 Training was extended to Azerbaijan and
Congo, who rank 150 and 168 out of 180, respectively, on Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index. 156 And, Pakistan continues to
receive support despite a 2007 Asia/Pacific Group threat to suspend membership
for noncompliance, 157 and despite the fact that the current president, Mr. Asif Ali
Zardari (a.k.a.
"Mr. 10%"), has himself served an 11 year jail term on corruption
158
charges.
Lastly, the South African Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), 159 an Egmont
member amazingly enough, continues to have access to the secure server. I say
"amazingly enough" because despite a high density of Nigerian, Pakistani, and
Indian drug traffickers, and Russian, Israeli, Lebanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese
organized crime syndicates, "the number of money laundering and terrorist finance
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions is . . . very low.' 160 Further still,

currency. See id.
150. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2006), available at

http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vo12/html/62136.htm.
151.
152.
153.
154.

DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 7.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 333.
The Egmont Group, Financial Intelligence

Units

of

the

World

http://www.egmontgroup.org/fdes/ibrary-egmont-docs/list-current-egmont-members.pdf

(May

2008),

[hereinafter

Egmont].
155. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 398.

156. Transparency, supra note 148.
157. DEP'T OF STATE, supranote 11, at 356.
158. Jane Perlez, From Prison to Zenith of Politics in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008,

availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/1 1/world/asia/i lpstan.html?pagewanted=print.
159. Egmont, supra note 155.
160. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 417-18.
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despite country-specific FATF recommendations made in 2003, to this day South
requirement to report its
Africa has all but ignored implementation - including the
161
significant volume of internal hawala-type transactions.
E. United States Regulation."FormalSector
Less than one month after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States, the domestic machinery of the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial
communities began scrambling a counterattack. Then-Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill, on September the 24, 2001 voiced this aggressive urgency as follows:
If you have any involvement in the financing of the al Qaida
organization, you have two choices: cooperate in this fight, or we will
freeze your US assets; we will punish you for providing the resources
that make these evil acts possible. We will succeed in starving the
terrorists of funding and shutting down the institutions that support or
62

facilitate terrorism.1

On the same day, President Bush announced Executive Order 13224 which
authorizes both the freezing of assets within the US and the denial of access to US
financial markets. 163 When coupled with UNSCRs 1267, 1373, and 1390, the
order, in theory, imposes AML/CFT and cooperative duties on our "partners"
abroad.164

On October of the same year, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act was signed into law.' 65 "The Patriot Act" calls for harsher
penalties, an expansion of investigative and designation powers, and an
enhancement of information sharing among law enforcement communities,
between law enforcement and private financial institutions, and within the
the Patriot Act calls for a retooling of Bank
financial sector itself.' 66 In addition,
67
Secrecy Act (BSA) provisions.1
The BSA (31 USC §§ 5311-5330) was originally established in 1970 to fight
tax evasion and organized crime.' 68 Though there was a revamp in 1992 which
expanded BSA application to financial institutions other than banks, 16 9 real
ballooning of the regulatory regime did not occur until after 9/11. Section 358 of
intelligence and
the Patriot Act expanded "the scope of BSA to include
' 70
counterintelligence to protect against international terrorism.'
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 419.
TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 28, at 2.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 10.
Id.

THE SEC'Y. OF THE TREASURY, THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 356(c) OF THE USA

PATRIOT ACT 2 n.2 (2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/356report.pdf.
168. Id. at2.
169. Id.
170. THE SEC'Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 168.
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This expanded mission is carried out by Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the US FIU. FinCEN is tasked with three
principal service missions: (1) to analyze financial intelligence, (2) to control BSA
implementation, and (3) to oversee international financial intelligence collection.17
"'
That said, the core of FinCEN's contribution stems from the collection, sorting,
and analysis of BSA reports.
"BSA requires many financial institutions to create 'paper trails' by keeping
records and filing reports on certain transactions."' 72 These paper linkages allow
law enforcement to trace illicit funds back to their source. Currency Transaction
Reports (CTRs), for example, must be filed for any exchange with the same
customer in the same day which exceeds $10,000.173 And, Currency and Monetary
Instrument Reports (CMIRs) must be filed for cross-border
movement of cash and
174
bearer negotiable instruments of $10,000 or more.
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are to be filed if the transaction involves
$2,000 (in individual or aggregate form) and appears to be "suspicious" in
nature. 175 Suspicious activities include an attempt to structure (a.k.a. "smurf')
transactions to avoid CTR reporting requirements.1 76 Smurfing is accomplished by
breaking a large transaction into multiple, smaller transactions which would fall
below the $10,000 CTR threshold. Another red flag might be a transaction(s) that
appears to lack any business purpose: higher than normal levels of account

activity, for example the cycling of funds between various accounts, and same-day
deposits and withdrawals without any reasonable explanation might suggest illicit
activity. Lastly, and obviously,
any proceeds that are blatantly of criminal
177
generation must be reported.
With nearly 50 data fields, SARs are really the key to combating terrorism
finance in the formal financial sector. 178 In fact, a former director of FinCEN is
179
quoted as saying "With SARs, it is now like having a haystack full of needles."'
The informational value that SARs forms provide stems not only from the breadth
of detail solicited, but also from the breadth of institutions that are required to file.

171. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 132.
172. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BANK SECRECY ACT

REQUIREMENTS, A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES 1, available at
http://www.msb.gov/materials/enIbank-reference.pdf [hereinafter BANK].
173. Id.
174. BANK, supra note 173.
175. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORTING

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY, A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR MONEY SERVICE BUSINESSES,
available at http://www.msb.gov/materials/en/report-reference.pdf [hereinafter REPORTING].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See ANNEX, pp. 82-84.
179. CASSARA, supra note 4, at136.
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'Financial institutions' (a term which US Treasury uses to include banks,
savings and loans, credit unions, and other depository institutions) 180 are, of course,
under BSA purview, but so too are nontraditional financial institutions (e.g.
casinos and brokers and dealers in securities). Money Service Businesses (MSBs)
are also grouped under this latter category. Money Service Businesses are defined
as:
Any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an
organized business concern, providing one or more of the following
services:
money orders, traveler's checks, check cashing, currency dealing
or exchange, stored value, AND
Conducts more than $1,000 in money service business activity:
with one person, in one or more transactions (in one type of
activity), on any one day, OR
18
Provides money transfers [a Money Transmitter] in any amount. '
Money Transmitters are defined as:
A person that engages as a business in the transfer of funds through a
financial institution is a money transmitter and an MSB, regardless of
Generally, the acceptance and
the amount of transfer activity.
transmission of funds as an integral part of a transaction other than the
funds transmission itself (for example, in connection with the sale of
securities or other property), will not cause a person to be a money
transmitter. 182
Generally, MSBs, in accordance with 31 CFR Part 103.41, must register with
FinCEN within 180 days of establishment. 183 This brings us to what I call
'Loophole 1'. What would stop an individual from closing shop on day 179 and
then reopening the following week? This is not simply your author playing devil's
advocate. Our record for securing guilty verdicts when it comes to prosecution on
terrorism finance charges is very poor. 184 Therefore, identifying and eliminating
loopholes which allow these characters to flirt with criminality while technically
following the letter of the law is quite important.

180. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING
PREVENTION: A MONEY SERVICE BUSINESS GUIDE 4, availableat http://www.fincen.gov/
statutesregs/guidance/pdf/msbpreventionguide.pdf [hereinafter MONEY].
181. Id. at45.
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id.at 6.
184. IBRAHIM WARDE, THE PRICE OF FEAR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERROR

95-97 (University of California Press 2007); U.S. v. Benevolence Int'l. Found. No. 02 CR 414, 2002
WL 31050156 (N.D.I11. Sept. 13, 2002).
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Further, the weakness of this provision comes in the form of accountability, or
rather the lack thereof. If confronted, what prevents a savvy, unregistered MSB
that has been operating for years from claiming that they just opened for business
last month? Are we really to believe that our monitoring efforts are so substantial
today that we know, and more importantly can prove in a court of law, when
exactly this 180 day period began? We simply cannot count on MSBs to report (or
to report accurately) to FinCEN. We must police them better.
And, while I understand that the FBI may have the monopoly on terrorism
finance investigations within the United States, the Bureau simply lacks the
resources to tackle an issue of this magnitude alone. Our local law enforcement
officials must be trained to spot suspect businesses. Whether this occurs within a
specially designated branch or as part of a larger Counter-terrorism (CT)
contingent under city or county jurisdiction, it must occur. At a minimum,
numerical superiority puts officers/detectives in a unique position to provide
quantitative tactical intelligence through contact. If at a later stage the FBI takes
over the case, great, but the Bureau will never make that case without the
assistance of these feeder-cells. There are some that would suggest that security
would be compromised by an expansion of those 'in the circle'. This is simply not
the case. There would be no 'circle' to speak of; information would flow in a
unidirectional, linear fashion (i.e. towards the Bureau and FinCEN as end-users).
Loophole 2: While BSA requires MSBs to establish written Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) procedures, such programs need not be reviewed by outside
consultants. "Such review may be conducted by an officer or employee of the
money service business .... ,,185 This is quite troubling to say the least when the
objective of the review is to "determine whether the business is operating in
compliance with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act ..
,, 6 Why is a
compliance determination, one with potential national security ramifications, not
considered a nondelagable duty? Borrowing from Professors Prosser and Keeton,
a nondelegable duty is defined as one in which "the responsibility is so important
to the community that the
employer [the US government] should not be permitted
1' 87
to transfer it to another."
Perhaps this shocking approach stems from the 2004 Second International
Conference on Hawala. The 'Conference Statement' from that session states the
desire to "avoid over-regulation that might drive [Informal Funds Transfer
systems] operations underground."' 188 Two comments: (1) the criminal elements

185. 31 C.F.R. § 103.125(d)(4) (2002).
186. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2006-G012,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT REVIEWS OF MONEY SERVICE BUSINESS

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAMS 1 (2006), availableat http://www.msb.gov/pdf/GuidanceMSBIndependentAudits9-21 .pdf.

187. W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

512

(West Publ'g

Co. 1984) (1941).
188. Int'l Monetary Fund, Second Int'l. Conference on Hawala, Abu Dhabi (Apr. 5, 2004), in
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS at

Monetary Fund 2005).
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that both own and use these MSBs/IFTs/IVTs already operate underground, and
(2) when has it ever been the policy of law enforcement officials to allow criminal
activity to continue in fear that a crackdown might force criminals to work harder
at their craft? If anything, we need to ramp up enforcement efforts, thus exacting
additional risks/costs on these services. Once those risks/costs eat into profit
margins, those using these informal transmission services for mere economical
reasons will go elsewhere when such costs are inevitably passed on the customer.
The only clients remaining will be the malefactors that are willing to pay higher
rates for the continued promise of secrecy. As such, analytical teams could then
narrow their focus to these specific individuals. There is a very large caveat here:
before such a crackdown there must be a place, a well regulated culturally sensitive
189
place, for the affected to go.
Bottom-line: agnostic to source (of such bad policy), if such delegation is
truly the prevailing mentality of government today then why stop there? Why not
disband the IRS and simply have taxpayers audit and then fine themselves? Why
not get rid of all corporate and securities statutes and have companies like Enron
and Lehman decide what's best to report? The answer to all the above is, of
course, because: (1) people (both natural and juridical) are rational actors that will
take advantage of any given system if allowed to do so, and (2) the core function
of government is to govern.
I am not calling for larger government or for more legislation, I am simply
calling for enforcement of the laws and policies that we already have. For
example, in a commissioned study done in the mid-1990's MSBs in the US were
estimated to number nearly 200,000, and yet despite our registration requirement,
by the end of 2004 only 22,000 had registered. 190 More recently, in a 2006 report
by the World Bank's Ole Andreassen, competition from the informal sector (i.e.
unregistered MSBs) is cited as a chief obstacle to those running legitimate
remittances businesses in the US. 19 1 If we don't do better, we risk sending a signal
that reads we can 't do better. As such, it is only logical for MSBs to join their
informal peers.
With examples like these, and there are more, how can we be so involved in
training and in funding AML/CFT programs abroad
in nations that refuse
anything beyond superficial institution of policy while so poorly performing at
home? If the difficulty is in the identification of illegal remitters, perhaps we
could take notice of how the formal remitters garner business. In the same
Andreassen article, the following data was presented: "[m]ost firms market their
service through newspaper advertisements (47.83 percent), radio (37.88 percent),

189. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems:
International Best Practices Annex 4, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER
REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 102, 105 (International Monetary Fund 2005).
190. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 201.
191. Ole E. Andreassen, Fin. Sector, The World Bank, Remittance Service Providers in the United
States: How Remittance Firms Operate and How They Perceive Their Business Environment, at i.,
(June 2006).

2009

HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE

405

and community events (40.91 percent) [and word of mouth (19.4 percent)].', 192 I
am willing to bet that illegal remitters use the very same methodologies as their
legal counterparts. As such, to find these individuals we need to listen to the local
AM radio stations, read ethnic newspapers, and get out into the community. All of
the above, however, requires personnel, which in turn requires funding. And, to be
frank, I'm not sure that we are that dedicated to this mission.
I don't mean to suggest that the US government has failed since 9/11. Any
attempt to paint the situation as such would be a blatant mischaracterization. In
fact, just 3 years ago, in the "Final Report on 9/11 Commission
Recommendations," the war against terrorist financing was the only category to
receive an 'A' grade. 193 Despite these accomplishments, however, what worries
me now is the level to which this once urgent push to stamp out terrorism finance
has been both tempered by initial successes and sidetracked by disconnects
between senior level managers and agents. As George Friedman - the founder of
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (better known as Stratfor) - once said "The weakness of
the US is not our soldiers, nor their numbers,
but the vast distance that separates
194
fight."'
who
those
from
American leaders
In 2002, for example, then-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill flew halfway
across the world to visit a Citibank branch in Bahrain that specialized in Islamic
finance. 195 As an aside, this is not an industry that needs our promotional
assistance given that (1) by 2004, Islamic banks boasted $260 billion in assets and
another $400 billion in investments, 196 and (2) lax sectoral regulation continues to
be a major security gap globally. Regardless, in the words of then-Treasury Under
Secretary for International Affairs, John Taylor, "The fanfare of a cabinet
197
member's visit helped us publicize . . . what Islamic finance was all about."'

While I'm sure at the policy-level this fanfare - along with the establishment of a
"visiting scholar in Islamic Finance" chair and the institution of an "Islamic
Finance 101" class at Treasury to promote understanding was trumpeted in the
name of political correctness, at the agent-level these things are seen for what they
really are, distractions to enforcement objectives.
Also at the senior management level, and with more damning consequence, I
again point to the disappearance of initiative once FATF Special
Recommendations were purportedly adopted abroad. Particular leaders have
apparently formed the view that good legislation is equivalent to good result so
long as specious public efforts are demonstrated. Problem states that "aspire" to
adopt the recommendations are forgiven for failure of implementation as long as
they agree to host a hawala conference, or chair an event on Islamic finance, or
promote "outreach." Shaukat Aziz, both former Pakistani finance minister and
192. Id. at 29.
193. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 27.
194. GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S SECRET WAR: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE

BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES 339 (Doubleday 2004).
195. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 25.
196. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 205.
197. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 25 (emphasis added).
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prime minister, was lauded for chairing just such an outreach event in Washington
in April 2002;198 clearly the Pakistanis have cracked down on hawala since that
day, right? Sultan Bin Nasser al-Suwaidi, governor of the Central Bank of the
United Arab Emirates, was praised for his willingness to host regional initiatives to
talk about illicit remittance; 199 clearly the UAE is no longer a corridor for terrorist
funds, right? The Saudi government in June 2004 promised to shut down all
charities abroad and to establish a "Charity Commission" to regulate the export of
all funds; 200 surely, four years after that announcement, that Commission is up and
running, right?
With regard to our initial successes, many millions of dollars have indeed
been frozen in the formal financial system since 9/11.201 True, some of those funds
can be considered the low-hanging fruit of the financial underworld, but many of
those dollars -the hard targets - were captured by creative, groundbreaking efforts
by Treasury and others. One such program was the SWIFT operation. SWIFT: the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a Brusselsbased banking consortium that routes 11 million transactions a day between banks,
brokerage houses, and stock exchanges. 20 2 By monitoring the $6 trillion a day and
the more than 7,800 financial institutions that use this service, the Treasury
Department, the FBI, and the CIA were able to identify multiple terrorist cells both
in the US and abroad.20 3
Unfortunately, the New York Times, in 2006, chose to publish a story
exposing this ongoing, highly classified program. 20 4 Believe it or not, the bad guys
read The Times too. As such, the program was effectively hamstrung by this
irresponsible decision to go to print. And, if this disclosure was not demoralizing
enough, we acquiesced in the establishment of an external audit to ensure that
collection programs were not "inappropriate. 20 5 Perspective: we place external
audit requirements on ourselves and yet we allow MSBs to self-regulate.
F. U.S. Regulation: Informal Sector
Despite unavoidable overlap, thus far we have focused on formal sector
regulation. However, Section 359 of the Patriot Act also includes informal value
transfer systems (IVTSs).2 °6 IVTSs operate either in parallel to the formal sector through underground banking and money transmission services or in tandem with
the formal sector
through the holding of "settling accounts" in traditional
financial institutions. The latter form offers tremendous insight into the

198. Id. at 17.
199. Id. at 60.
200. Dan Murphy, Saudi Crackdown on CharitiesSeen as Incomplete, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 9, 2004.
201. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror,N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312 (2001).

2009

HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE

complacency and, at times, overt criminality of the formal financial sector, e.g.
BCCI and Banco Delta Asia (more on this later). The former, which include
alternative remittance systems like hawala, are much more difficult to deal with,
for by avoiding the formal sector altogether they avoid BSA freezing, despite the
fact that BSA requirements are still applicable. In fact, Osama bin Laden, in a
Pakistani press interview, is quoted as saying, "Al Qaeda is comprised of modem,
educated young people who are as aware of the cracks in the Western financial
system as they are of the lines in their own hands. These are
the very flaws in the
20 7
Western financial system which is becoming a noose for it."
Recently, we have begun to adopt more creative monitoring programs to
cement these "cracks" (e.g. trade-based money laundering). Trade Transparency
Unities (TTUs), for example, now analyze import/export data in search of
discrepancies in documentation and actual trade volumes. 20 8 "By comparing
specific declared imports and exports from both sides, determining indications of
possible overinvoicing, underinvoicing, fraudulent trading practices, export
incentive fraud, and other illegal techniques is a relatively simple process. 20 9 This
is particularly helpful in a world in which spot checks from customs agents have to
compete with "rush delivery" services from FedEx to UPS to freight forwarders to
free trade zone (FTZ) expediters.
Analysis after-the-fact thus enables the
discovery of discrepancies that were not made patent to customs agents in realtime.
TTUs are indeed likely to help in the tracking of everything from textiles to
diamonds to gold. However, even here efficacy is premised upon cooperation by
foreign customs agencies and assumptions that diamonds and gold, for example,
are traded, rather than smuggled, across borders. Further, the effectiveness of
TTUs depends not only upon the willingness of foreign governments to share
information, but on their ability to accurately collect and communicate that data.
In poorer countries, countries that are disproportionately using underground
banking and trade-based value manipulation, limitations with regard to both
technology and personnel are very real obstacles. Lastly, import/export data
obfuscation, willfully or accidentally, through comingling and/or mislabeling in
FTZs, for example, furthers potential inaccuracies.
With regards to cash couriers, little has changed for the better. Yes,
technology has been employed at entrance and exit points to detect large quantities
of currency. And, yes, CMIRs provide hefty penalties for not reporting the crossborder movement of cash or bearer negotiable instruments (e.g. stocks, bonds,
etc.), but only if such amounts are greater than $10,000. 210 As stated above, I feel
this amount is far too high for a blanket approach.
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At a minimum, risk modeling needs to be incorporated with regards to the
end-destination of each voyage. The amount of money that a private individual
can carry on his/her person from the US to Singapore should not be the same
allowable amount for travel to Sudan, for example. The money, which is badly
needed in many of these regions I concede, can still reach these countries, but
through the financial system. Further, I was careful to distinguish private
individuals from not-for-profit workers and other governmental and quasigovernmental groups.
Ultimately, yes, a criminal/terrorist could fly to a "safe" country with $10,000
in tow only to then hop on another plane headed to Syria or Iran. But, that
criminal/terrorist now has to purchase two plane tickets (a layover would not
suffice, for the focus would be on the end-destination), thus doubling both his/her
operational cost and paper-trail. Doubling the paperwork alone increases the
chance of eventual detection and apprehension.
With regard to the abuse of charities, the IRS and the FBI are making very
real progress. 2 11 Their efforts, however, are hampered by both noncooperation
abroad (as mentioned supra) and by the complexities involved. For example, in a
case coming out of Russia, a foreign national gave money to a charity, a company
(receiving money from other charities) also gave money to that same charity, that
charity then gave money to other charities (both legitimate and illegitimate), and
one of those recipient charities then finally distributed
the money to individuals in
212
cash, wire transfer, courier, and goods form.

With this level of intentional confusion, one can imagine just how tough of a
task investigation really is, much less prosecution. Add to this, the cross-border
transmissions of funds. Sophisticated criminals utilize nation-states, failed states,
and even Indian (Native American) reservations to take advantage of any
perceived jurisdictional tolerance. Any international dimension then increases
tracking difficulties in orders of magnitude. This holds true even when dealing
with cooperative, technically capable countries.
V. CONCLUSION

A. Disincentivized Cooperation

There is a section in FinCEN's Money Laundering Prevention: A Money
Services Business Guide entitled "MSBs Can Help Fight Money Laundering. 2 13
This section title, in my opinion, is a perfect summation of US/Jeffersonian dogma.
We assume that MSBs want to help fight money laundering when it is, in fact, in
their financial interest not to. Given an absence of enforcement, this holds true
even in the face of hefty civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.
Regulatory hurdles cost time and money (e.g. registration in the UK costs £60

211. Paul O'Neill, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on Next Terrorist Asset List
(Jan. 9, 2002), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po9l0.htm.
212. FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING 26 (Financial Action Task Force/Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.
213. MONEY, supra note 181, at 10.
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pounds - approximately $113 -per premises), 214 and auditors bring unwanted
attention. This attention then scares off clients that seek anonymity both for
cultural and criminal reasons.
In a similar vein we assume that countries in the Persian Gulf, for example,
want to cooperate on AML/CFT initiatives when, in fact, it is in their political
(domestic and regional), religious, and financial interests not to. In Saudi Arabia,
for example, "the financial sinews of al-Qaeda [flow] from numerous supporters in
the Kingdom, and the Saudi government [is] loath to trigger the consequences of
restraining these supporters. 215 This is true both in the context of direct support
and in terms of more peripheral contributions via charitable giving. In fact, the
fragility of Saudi desire/ability to manage the latter is particularly vacant for a
variety of religious and historical reasons.
In 1744, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa'ud formed a ruling
coalition.2 16 The Saudi royal family, for its part, agreed to uphold a particularly
virulent, uber-conservative Wahhabi jurisprudence. The Wahhabis, also known as
"the asserters of the divine unity (al-Muwahhidun or AhN al-Tawhid), 217 in
upholding their portion of the bargain, agreed to provide religious legitimacy to the
crown so long as shari 'a - Islamic law - remained supreme. 218
Under Saudi law, the Nizam Asasi ("Basic Regulation"), a constitutional
equivalent - actual constitutions are avoided so as not to offend the Wahhabi ban
on manmade legislation,219- governs, not UNSCRs not FATF recommendations
and not even Saudi royal decrees in many instances. Article 7 explicitly states as
much: "[T]he Prophet's tradition and the Qur'an and Sunnah reign supreme over
all other state regulations."22 ° While Article 48 later cedes some discretionary
authority to the ruler, it too is qualified, "The system of judges which is applied to
all cases presented before it is shari'a rules according to the teachings of the Holy
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the regulations set by the ruler, provided
they do not
221
contradictthe Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah (alteration in original)."
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Charitable giving (zakat) is not only encouraged under shari'a, it is mandated
as one of the five pillars of Islam.222 This, as previously mentioned, is exactly
what makes regulation so contentious in the eyes of the proletariat - those
especially susceptible to radical Islamic messages and, more importantly, to the
powerful Wahhabi leadership - the authors of those extremist messages. This is
particularly true when the US - seen as a Christian (rather than secular) country in
the Middle East - is painted as targeting Saudi charities with religious connotations
(e.g. Al Haramain,meaning "the two holy places, '223 i.e. Mecca and Medina).
As such, and as made frighteningly clear by the May 2003 al-Qaeda attack in
Riyad, the Saudi royal family is in no position to impose regulations that may be
deemed a violation of Qur'anic teachings. Lastly, even if the Saudis established
the long-promised Charity Commission, thus moving beyond superficial
condemnation of charitable exploitation, two obstacles remain. The first: citizens
would be free to ignore such attempts at regulation under Article 48 of the Nizam
Asasi, upon direction from their religious leaders.224 The second: no amount of
hypothetical regulation would keep a wealthy Saudi businessman from personally
writing checks, so to speak, to individuals or organizations of his choosing.
The Emirates, on the other hand, appear to fight full compliance in the name
of profit margins and regional sensitivities rather than religious fervor. As an
example, at a soi-disant Islamic bank I was told that I could not open an account
without a residence permit. A permit, however, as it was made clear to me, could
materialize for a small fee. From May 15 to 16, 2002, the UAE hosted the Abu
Dhabi Declaration on Hawala 5 That meeting was followed by the Second
International Conference on Hawala in April of 2004.226 In both instances the
UAE was applauded for their "efforts. 227 Upon the June 2008 announcement of
the addition of 13 new AML/CFT regulations, the following appeared in the
Financial Times: "Western officials have lauded the UAE's move to regulate
hawala ....
,2 28 Unconditional praise continued even after a curiously timed - the
day before the World Customs Organization (WCO) was to meet - declaration by
the director general of the UAE's Federal Customs Authority which voiced an
"urgent need" for regional ports to combat smugglers.2 29
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And yet, Dubai was the transit route of much of the funding for the September
11, 2001 attacks, and served as both A.Q. Khan's - the "godfather" of the
230
Pakistani nuclear bomb - equipment source and cubbyhole for illicit profits.
The infamous al-Barakaat remittance service was headquartered in Dubai, 231 and
Dubai's Gold Souq - the largest in Arabia 232 - is widely known for its use in money
laundering. 233 The Petroline FZC company - used to pay the Iraqi government
millions of dollars in bribes to secure "oil for food contracts," thus circumventing
UN sanctions - was based in the UAE.234 So too were the backers of the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI): Sheik Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan
(Ruler of Abu Dhabi and 77 percent owner of the bank), Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed
al-Nahyan (son of Sheik Zayed), Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (son of
Sheik Zayed), and Kemal Adham (former head of Saudi intelligence). 235
BCCI, the largest Muslim bank in the world at the time, essentially
institutionalized hawala; "the bank arranged for a deposit in the local currency at
one end and a withdrawal in a different currency at the other, without an audit trial
or paperwork - a basic form of money laundering." 236 As lax regulation began
attracting the money of more sophisticated criminals like Abu Nidal, Manuel
Noriega, Munther Bilbeisi, and intelligence operatives, BCCI added more layers
and shells to accommodate. To illustrate:
[A] subsidiary called BCCI Overseas, based in the Cayman Islands, was
100 percent owned by BCCI Holdings in Luxembourg. The senior
Cayman company was a British charity, called ICIC Foundation, which
owned an investment company, ICIC Foundation Cayman, which
owned 35 percent of BCCI's Geneva-based bank, Banque de Commerce
et Placements (the rest was owned by BCCI Holdings S.A. - the main
Luxembourg company - and Union Bank of Switzerland). The ICIC
Foundation also was an investor in BCCI; it borrowed $74 million from
an affiliated company, ICIC Overseas, to acquire 9 percent of BCCI
shares. Other Cayman investors in BCCI Holdings were the ICIC Staff
Benefit Trust and theICIC Staff Benefit Fund - pension funds for BCCI
237

In 2008, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) warned
the Dubai Mercantile Exchange for its lack of adequate reporting and
transparency.238 Many authors have written about the abuse of FTZs in the UAE
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generally, and Dubai's Jebel Ali in particular.2 39 And, as best illustrated in a recent
Portfolio article by Christopher Stewart, smuggling, with government
acquiescence, continues unabated despite the UAE Federal Customs Authority
director general's "urgent" call for action.24 °
According to the article, 30 to 40 percent of the $1 1 billion in goods sent from
the US to the UAE make their way to Iran - in violation of both US and UN
sanctions. 2 4 1 "Some exports are innocuous, like refrigerators and stoves; others,
such as high-speed computer chips, military hardware, and nuclear components,
are more ominous., 242 As Michael Jacobson, senior fellow at the Washington
Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, puts it "[t]hey're
reluctant to go too far, in part out of fear of antagonizing Iran, but mainly because
of the bottom line. 243
The Stewart article is important here beyond simply chronicling just how little
meaning sanctions have to our allies. It also illustrates, yet again, this disjuncture
between the efficacy of freezes and designations in the formal sector compared
with that of the informal sector. For example, the Treasury Department designated
Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah for funding Hezbollah and facilitating Iranian
missile procurement, respectively.244
One might assume that this pair of
designations would cripple these institutions, as such a designation did to Banco
Delta Asia, thereby precipitating a crisis of sorts in Iran. That assumption,
however, would be wrong. Such designations, while painful, are blunted by
informal "solutions" (e.g. the smuggling of goods and the usage of hawala).
In a 2008 Financial Times (Tehran) article, Daniel Glaser, the deputy
assistant secretary of terrorist financing at US Treasury, claimed that the fact that
hawala business is booming is proof positive that sanctions are working. 245 This is
a bit like bragging about how sturdy your three-sided fortress is; what about the
back door?
Secretary Glaser continued: "[i]f what our sanctions and the
international sanctions have done is to push organizations like the Quds force [an
elite, self-funded Iranian unit that perpetuates terrorist movements abroad] out of
the international financial system and into costlier, riskier and less efficient
systems, then that is a good thing. 246 I would counter that statement by asking if
that's what our sanctions have in fact done. Arguably, hawala is cheaper (not
costlier), just as safe, and more efficient in terms of time and paperwork.
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Note: my intention in this section was not to single out Saudi Arabia and the
UAE for reproach. In fact, if not for page limitations, I could write volumes on the
current apathy and duplicity of our "allies" abroad. Doing so, however, would be
redundant with regard to this central premise: the system, as-is and as presented, is
broken. Otherwise-friendly nations in the Middle East and in Asia have very little
incentive to cooperate with our AML/CFT programs, period.
B. Incentivized Cooperation
The US and European partners must find alternatives to financially
contentious AML/CFT program implementation. In theory, while individuals in
poorer nations benefit from informal flows (in cash, courier, or trade form), the
governments of those nations do not. In fact, hawala-type systems were
developed, in part, to avoid perceived corruption by circumventing officialdom.
As such, one would imagine that these governments are eager to recapture this lost
revenue by cracking down on the informal sector, but this does not appear to be the
case. Perhaps the problem is that governments fail to see just how profitable
regulation could be.
As a first step, one might point out the extent of lost revenue, thus motivating
cash-strapped governments to commit to often substantial enforcement
expenditures. In Bangladesh, for example, 40-50 percent of annual government
revenues are generated through customs duties.247
In dollar terms, that's
approximately $3.4 billion.2 48 One would assume that these kinds of figures would
demonstrate to the Bangladeshi government, for example, that by allowing duty
manipulation/avoidance (commonly used in the settling stage of the hawala
process) a primary source of their funding is threatened.
On the other hand, governments may very well be aware of the extent to
which informal financial systems thrive in their countries. There is even evidence
to suggest that they may be encouraging, for a price, such sub-rosa activity. In a
2005 survey of 73 official remittance firms (i.e. those that have registered and
presumably comply with all additional MSB regulations) in the US, nearly half of
249
those operators cite recipient country corruption as a major obstacle to business.
By extension, if corruption is that prevalent in official circles, the "hush money"
required of illegal operators must be greater in both occurrence and amount.
In the same 2005 survey, the median firm processed $5 million in transactions
per month.
In strictly financial terms, with numbers this large it's obvious just
how profitable graft, even in small percentages, could be for non-cooperative
governments. Further, and in the social policy context, by allowing injections of
unregulated, untaxed dollars to reach their populations, regimes feel freed, to some
extent, from having to provide public services to their people. This is particularly
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true when, as in the case of Afghanistan, 80 percent of all healthcare and
educational services are provided by NGOs.25 '
A second way to entice non-cooperative governments to enforce AML/CFT
policy is to have them partner with formal financial institutions in the private
sector. This is precisely what occurred between the United States and Mexico. I
argue, however, that the institutionalization of the MEX/US remittance corridor,
this formalizing the informal, isn't replicable. This is principally so because the
sheer volume of money, and thus the incentive for the private sector to participate,
doesn't exist in any other bilateral relationship.
"In 2002, Mexico was the largest recipient of formal remittances flows in the
world. 2 52 By 2003, remittance flows reached $13 billion, thus surpassing both
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mexico and tourism-related revenues.253 This
was made possible because policymakers at the highest levels insisted on
regulatory harmonization. This coordination was so involved that an FDICConsulate General of Mexico joint task force was even established to educate
migrant workers on their remittance options.254
At the individual level, on the US side, the Treasury Department "asked the
Federal Reserve to work with Mexico to improve the payments system between the
countries, which it did. At [Treasury's] suggestion the World Bank also got
involved .... ,,55 The Mexicans, for their part, simultaneously strengthened the
security of, and access to, Mexican Consular I.D. Cards (MatriculaConsular de
Alta Seguridad). With Treasury and the Fed on board, and with the Mexican
government guaranteeing the fidelity of new security features on the cards, Wells
Fargo, Citibank, Bank of America, US Bank, HSBC, Washington Mutual, Banco
Popular, and others all facilitated remittance senders.256 Ultimately, remittance
volumes encouraged harmonization which encouraged broad competition for
business which sent the prices for such services plummeting. As a result, workers
stopped using the informal sector in droves.257
This corridor formalization is exactly what the World Bank's Sam Maimbo
has called for: "an effective strategy for isolating illicit funds being transferred
through the hawala system is to encourage legal transfers to migrate to
conventional financial instruments."258 That said, Mr. Maimbo admits the
following: "[t]he effectiveness of this strategy depends on the ability of formal
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financial instruments to compete with the hawala dealers with respect to exchange
rates, speedy service, and coverage of areas that now lack banking services. 2 59 As
stated earlier, trade volumes are simply too low elsewhere to create this kind of
extraordinary bilateral facilitation. And, without such governmental support,
traditional financial institutions are unlikely to invest the time and money to induce
the kind of migration to conventional financial instruments that Maimbo is calling
for. Further, even where substantial flows might exist, the security challenges
involved automatically rule out involvement by the likes of HSBC, Bank of
America, and other majors.
It must be noted that even in the case of the US/MEX corridor, coverage areas
are still limited principally to urban centers. Thus, the draw of door-to-door
hawala delivery still remains for underserviced rural communities even where
there is extraordinary governmental cooperation. It must also be noted that any
US, World Bank, and IMF involvement automatically complicates program
acceptance in the Middle East and in South Asia.
Dr. Hamed El-Said and Dr. Jane Harrigan summarize the reasons for this in
their 2006 Middle East Journal article "Globalization, International Finance, and
Political Islam in the Arab World. 2 60 Point one: the conditions attached to
international aid stemming from "official organizations, particularly those based in
Washington" often demand a decline in social welfare spending. 261 Point two:
Islamist groups are eager to fill the gap by providing their own support through
religious charities.262 Point three: Islamist groups then exploit the withdrawal of
the state from the welfare sphere, thus calling into question the political legitimacy
of the regime. 63 As an aside, this is particularly troubling giving that US foreign
policy promotes democracy worldwide. As such, the results of those democratic
elections, if/when held, are sure to reflect such charitable giving - or lack thereof.
In sum, NGOs are not the answer because "none ... is anxious to perform so
well that it works itself out of a job. 264 Traditional financial institutions in the
private sector are not the answer for the dearth of incentives and plethora of
security challenges aforementioned. And, perhaps the World Bank and the IMF
are excludable for the way in which they are allegedly perceived in the Muslim
world. All of that being said, what alternatives then remain to incentivize
(financially, culturally, religiously, politically) governments to push business away
from hawaladars? Answer: micro-lenders.
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C. Micro-Lenders as an Alternative
In 1983, Muhammad Yunus, with the support of the Bangladeshi government,
founded Grameen Bank. 2 65 Grameen, as a micro-credit institution, lent very small,
uncollateralized sums to the poorest of individuals - to women in particular - in
rural communities. 266 Distributions were hand-delivered by bankers that lived in
the surrounding areas, spoke the local dialects, and lived by the same cultural
norms. 2 67 Dispersals were not contingent upon skills training and nor were they
hampered by superfluous administration and consultancy.26 8
In fact,
micromanagement enmity led young Grameen to butt heads with the World Bank
on more than one occasion. There was even a public rebuke of then-World Bank
president Barber Conable during a televised conference in 1986.269
While the World Bank did end up funding the Grameen Replicator Trust - a
fund to establish Grameen-type programs globally, the Polli Karma Sahayak
Foundation - a micro-credit wholesaler, and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP) and other Grameen initiatives, 270 this initial confrontation actually bought
Grameen a bit of "street credit" with poorer nations that may or may not have
shared the concerns listed in the Said-Harrigan article. And, while US officials
like Jimmy Carter and Hillary Clinton did eventually visit Grameen branches, only
Bengali officials were in attendance at the opening ceremony. Further, the
271
ceremony, held in Jamurki, Tangail, was begun with recitations from the Qu'ran.
A note on sharia compliance. With an ultraconservative Iranian regime now
in power, it is of particular interest that an adviser to Ahmadinejad on women's
affairs said the following: "There is nothing in shariah law or the Qu'ran against
what [Grameen is] doing., 272 Many Islamic scholars feel that Grameen is
exempted from the religious injunction on charging interest (riba) because those
being charged interest also own stakes in the bank 27 3 "The purpose of the
religious injunction against interest is to protect the poor from usury, but where the
poor own their own bank, the interest is in effect paid to the company they own,
and therefore to themselves. 274
This theatre, whether by design or not, earned our Nobel Laureate vast
cultural and religious dividends. Yunus was able to neutralize the concerns of Drs.
El-Said and Harrigan with nothing more than a low key opening ceremony and a
superficial tiff with a World Bank official. By allying with the government of
Bangladesh - the government at one point owned 60 percent of the bank Grameen was able to ensure its political survival. With an equity position, the
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government was incentivized to make the project work, to ensure economic
success. Simultaneously, by underwriting the project, the government reaps the
benefit of appearing empathetic and effectual.
With a proven track record in not only Bangladesh, but in India, Nepal,
Vietnam, China, Latin America, and Africa, I suggest that we encourage microcredit organizations to expand into the remittance field. We can promote these
groups as official alternatives to hawala. Micro-lenders, as with hawaladars, are in
a unique position to address all four informal sector incentives: (1) the absence of
formal sector alternatives, (2) cultural familiarity, (3) affordability, and (4)
anonymity. Further, as these micro-lender-MSB hybrids (MLMSBs) pair up with
their respective government partners, thus linking their financial fates, one would
expect to see a crackdown on market competitors (i.e. the informal sector). Market
dominance would replace any revenue (think bribes) that would be lost in
AML/CFT enforcement, and would bolster the credibility of these regimes with
their own people.
1. Formal Sector Alternatives
By their nature, micro-lenders are located in rural areas that are isolated from
capital and professional services. 275 These are the very communities over which
hawaladars now hold a monopoly. Remember that even with the US/MEX
corridor, the formal sector was unable to reach beyond urban centers. Microlenders are able to thrive in these regions where traditional institutions cannot, and
do not want to, operate.
2. Cultural Familiarity
Micro-credit staffers embody the trust element that is so essential to the
success of hawala, for they too are from the communities which they serve.
Language proficiency and cultural understanding provide access to these outlier
villages and inspires trust and, thereafter, community participation. In addition, in
many micro-lending models borrowers are simultaneously shareholders. By
owning the organization, or branch of that organization, it's no longer viewed as an
intrusion, but as an addition to the community.
3. Affordability
Micro-lending institutions are able to keep their costs down by utilizing local
resources and by conducting no-frills operations. With local staffers and Spartan
offices, these organizations can operate at a fraction of the budgetary and
infrastructural requirements of their more traditional peers. And, with government
partners, MLMSBs should receive preferential lending and tax incentives.
Further, the availability of turnkey technologies now allows these businesses
to operate more efficiently, without duplication of process or personnel. This
would also help in keeping track of AML/CFT due diligence and security features.
Yes, regulation -much of which micro-credit institutions now manage to avoid costs money. But, an expansion in services would offset an expansion in the cost
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of compliance via cross-selling. For example, many recipients of micro-credit are
simultaneously recipients of remittances. Further, many recipients of remittances
need to exchange those monies into local currency. Lastly, the adoption of riskbased-modeling with regards to transfer amounts 276 would exclude many of the
transactions that now occur, thus limiting the amount of actual AML/CFT
reporting required.
Without doubt, the initial period of service expansion would be difficult both
in terms of money and personnel. But, USAID and World Council of Credit
Unions (WOCCO) provide capacity-building support. 277
WOCCO further
provides, via its International Remittance Network (IRnet), "a vehicle by which to
send and distribute remittances at low cost, '278 thus blunting an inevitable increase
in marketing costs that MLMSBs would incur on the sending side. In addition,
SWIFT can provide direct funds transfer, and commercial bank and transmitter
partnerships can supply "access to international payment networks, foreign
exchange access, and risk management expertise. 2 79
The bottom-line, however, is that none of the above can occur without one of
a few things occurring, the first being a radical change in policy and regulation that
would allow the creation of MLMSBs. The second would be a change of legal
status, thus morphing micro-lenders into versions of full-fledged financial
institutions.
The third would be a series of micro-lender-private-sector
partnerships with those that already have the appropriate legal status and licensure
to conduct expanded financial services. With a dearth of research in this area, I am
not in a position to recommend one action above another. I would only add that, as
Pankaj Ghemawat writes in his latest book,28 ° contrary to Thomas Friedman's
assertions, the world is not flat. 281 As such, what might work well in India might
not work at all in Pakistan or Bangladesh or Malaysia.
4. Anonymity
With government partners, MLMSBs would escape much of the desire for
anonymity that illegal hawaladars (and by extension, their customers) now seek.
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Illegal immigrants will continue to associate formal financial institutions with
governmental organs, but MLMSB alliances with receiving countries are unlikely
to invoke this same trepidation. Pakistan, for example, is unlikely to report the
legal status of a U.K. remitter to authorities in England; Pakistan, after all, benefits
from the money being sent home. Further, the receiving government would be in
no position to adjudge the legality of a remitter living abroad. Lastly, "anonymity
by default" becomes a lesser obstacle because micro-lenders, by training and by
practice, are accustomed to dealing with, and putting at ease, individuals with
lower levels of formal education.
D. Conclusion
Nothing, including the creation of MLMSBs, will prove to be a panacea if
enforcement does not follow. While our country develops cutting-edge national
security programs, far too often the production stage is both where policy begins
and ends. Granted, enforcement dollars are finite, but I fear that inaction is
regarded as safer (politically) and has, therefore become the bureaucratic default.
Further, I have decided that lack of execution in this particular area either
stems from a loss of interest, or from deliberate misdirection regarding the recent
implementation of a secret program that is many, many times more effective than
was SWIFT. I am a cynic by nature, and unfortunately that means that I believe
the former to be true. Sexier topics naturally prevail in an election season,
however, given that terrorists tend to stage attacks around election cycles (e.g.
Spain and Pakistan), let's hope that I'm wrong.

